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§A contains the proofs for our technical statements in the paper. We present the proofs
for technical statements that we develop in this Appendix in §B. We use the following
identities for the standard normal random variable with cdf Φ(.) and pdf 휙(.) throughout
the Appendix: 휙
′
(푧) = −푧휙(푧), ∫ 푣−∞ 푧휙(푧)푑푧 = −휙(푣) and 1 > [ 휙(푣)1−Φ(푣)]2 − 푣휙(푣)1−Φ(푣) > 0,
where the last two inequalities are proven in Sampford (1953).
A Main Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: If the ﬁrm does not have the limited liability option, then
휋퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly concave in 퐾퐷 and the unique optimal capacity investment level 퐾
∗
퐷
and the optimal expected equity value 휋∗퐷 are given by
퐾∗퐷 =
⎧⎨⎩
퐾0퐷
.
=
(
휉(1+ 1
푏
)
(1−훾퐷)푐퐷
)−푏
if 퐵 ≥ 2푐퐷퐾0퐷
퐵
2푐퐷
if 2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷 ≤ 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾0퐷
퐾1퐷
.
=
(
휉(1+ 1
푏
)
(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
)−푏
if 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷,
(5)
휋∗퐷 =
⎧⎨⎩
2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷(1−훾퐷)
−(푏+1) +퐵 + 푃 if 퐵 ≥ 2푐퐷퐾0퐷
2휉 퐵2푐퐷 + 훾퐷퐵 + 푃 if 2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷 ≤ 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾0퐷
2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)
−(푏+1) +퐵(1 + 푎퐷) + 푃 if 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷
With limited liability, when the ﬁrm borrows (퐾퐷 >
퐵
2푐퐷
), we have 푙퐷(퐾퐷)
.
= 퐾
−1
푏
퐷 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) 2푐퐷−
퐾퐷
(−1− 1푏 )[퐵 (1 + 푎퐷) + 푃 ] such that the ﬁrm is able to pay back the face value of the loan
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if and only if 휉˜1 + 휉˜2 is no less than 푙퐷(퐾퐷). For 휉˜1 + 휉˜2 > 푙퐷(퐾퐷), the optimal equity value
Π∗퐷 > 0, and for 휉˜1 + 휉˜2 ≤ 푙퐷(퐾퐷), Π∗퐷 = 0. We obtain
∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
= −1
푏
퐾
(−1푏 −1)
퐷 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) 2푐퐷 +
(
1 +
1
푏
)
퐾퐷
(−2− 1푏 )[퐵 (1 + 푎퐷) + 푃 ] > 0. (6)
Therefore, we can identify the unique 퐾 푙퐷 < 퐾
푢
퐷 such that 푙퐷(퐾
푙
퐷)
.
= 2휉푙 and 푙퐷(퐾
푢
퐷)
.
= 2휉푢.
Since 푙퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly increasing in 퐾퐷, we have 푙퐷(퐾퐷) ≥ 2휉푢 for 퐾퐷 ≥ 퐾푢퐷; hence
Π∗퐷 = 0 at each 휉˜1 + 휉˜2 and 휋
∗
퐷 = 0 for 퐾퐷 ∈ [퐾푢퐷,∞). Therefore, it is suﬃcient to analyze
the problem for 퐾퐷 ∈ [0,퐾푢퐷). We have three separate cases to consider:
Case 1: For 퐾퐷 ∈
[
0, 퐵2푐퐷
]
, similar to the no limited liability case, the ﬁrm does not
borrow, and the expected equity value of the ﬁrm is 휋∗퐷 = max퐾퐷 2휉퐾
(1+ 1푏 )
퐷 + 퐵 + 푃 −
2푐퐷 (1− 훾퐷)퐾퐷.
Case 2: For 퐾퐷 ∈
[
퐵
2푐퐷
,퐾 푙퐷
]
, similar to the no limited liability case, the ﬁrm optimally
borrows, and is always able to pay back the face value of the loan.1 The expected equity
value of the ﬁrm is 휋∗퐷 = max퐾퐷 2휉퐾
(1+ 1푏 )
퐷 +퐵(1 + 푎퐷) + 푃 − 2푐퐷 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷)퐾퐷.
Case 3: For 퐾퐷 ∈
(
퐾 푙퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
the ﬁrm always borrows, and for some demand realization,
is not able to pay back the face value of the loan; hence the expected equity value of the
ﬁrm is
휋∗퐷 = max
퐾퐷
∫ ∫
Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
[
(휉˜1 + 휉˜2)퐾퐷
(1+ 1
푏
) − 2푐퐷퐾퐷(1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) +퐵(1 + 푎퐷) + 푃
]
푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2,
where Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
.
= {흃 : 휉1 + 휉2 ≥ 푙퐷(퐾퐷)} and 푓(휉1, 휉2) is the joint pdf of 흃.
Let 푔퐷(퐾퐷) denote the objective function in the overall optimization problem and
푔푖퐷(퐾퐷) denote the objective function in case 푖. It is easy to establish that 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is
continuous at the boundaries 퐾퐷 =
퐵
2푐퐷
and 퐾퐷 = 퐾
푙
퐷; and hence 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is continuous
in 퐾퐷. It follows from (5) that 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly concave in 퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
0,퐾 푙퐷
]
and
has a kink at 퐾퐷 =
퐵
2푐퐷
. We obtain
∂푔3퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
=
∫ ∫
Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
[(
1 +
1
푏
)
(휉1 + 휉2)퐾
( 1푏 )
퐷 − 2 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) 푐퐷
]
푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2. (7)
It is easy to verify that
∂푔2퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
∣
퐾푙퐷
− =
∂푔3퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
∣
퐾푙퐷
+ ; hence 푔퐷(퐾퐷) does not have a
kink at 퐾퐷 = 퐾
푙
퐷. Deﬁne 퐺(퐾퐷, 흃)
.
=
(
1 + 1푏
)
(휉1 + 휉2)퐾
( 1푏 )
퐷 − 2 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) 푐퐷 as
the integrand of (7) (without the density function). Note that 퐺(퐾퐷, 흃) is increasing in
1It can be shown that for 휉푙 ≥ 0 and 훾퐷 ≥ 0, 퐾푙퐷 ≥ 퐵2푐퐷 , where the equality only holds if 휉
푙 = 0 and
훾퐷 = 0.
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휉푖 for 푖 = 1, 2, and decreasing in 퐾퐷. We deﬁne 퐾ˆ퐷
.
=
(
휉푢(1+ 1푏 )
(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
)−푏
. We have
푙퐷(퐾ˆ퐷) = 2
(
1 + 1푏
)
휉푢
[
1− 퐵(1+푎퐷)+푃
2퐾ˆ퐷(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
]
< 2휉푢, thus 퐾ˆ퐷 < 퐾
푢
퐷 and is in the feasible
region of 퐾퐷. Note that for 흃
풖′ .= (휉푢, 휉푢), 퐺퐷
(
퐾ˆ퐷, 흃
풖
)
= 0. Since (휉1 + 휉2) takes its
maximum value at 흃 = 흃풖, and 퐺퐷(퐾퐷, 흃) is strictly increasing in 휉푖 for 푖 ∈ {1, 2}, we have
퐺퐷(퐾퐷, 흃) < 0 for 흃 ∈ Υ퐷(흃, 퐾ˆ퐷). Therefore ∂푔
3
퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
∣퐾ˆ퐷 < 0. Since 퐺퐷(퐾퐷, 흃) is strictly
decreasing in 퐾퐷,
∂푔3퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
< 0 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
퐾ˆ퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
.
In summary, 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly concave in 퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
0,퐾 푙퐷
]
(with a kink at 퐾퐷 =
퐵
2푐퐷
), and is strictly decreasing in 퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
퐾ˆ퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
. It follows that 푔퐷(퐾퐷) will be
unimodal if 퐾 푙퐷 ≥ 퐾ˆ퐷. Since ∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷 > 0 (from (6)), this is equivalent to 푙퐷(퐾ˆ퐷) ≤ 2휉푙,
which gives us 퐵 ≥ 퐵ℎ퐷. In this case, 퐾∗퐷 is in the strictly concave part and is unique. 퐾∗퐷
is identical to (5).
Proof of Proposition 2: In the proof of Proposition 1, we already established that the
stage-1 objective function 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly concave in 퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
0,퐾 푙퐷
]
and strictly
decreasing in 퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
퐾ˆ퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
. We obtain ∂푔퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷
∣∣∣
퐾푙퐷
=
(1+ 1푏 )2휉
(퐾푙퐷)
−1/푏
[
1−
(
퐾푙퐷
퐾1퐷
)− 1
푏
]
where 퐾1퐷 =
(
휉(1+ 1푏 )
(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
)−푏
. It follows that ∂푔퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷 ∣퐾푙퐷 > 0 if and only if 퐾
푙
퐷 < 퐾
1
퐷.
In this case 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly increasing for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
0,퐾 푙퐷
]
and strictly decreasing in
퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
퐾ˆ퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
. Since 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is continuous in 퐾퐷, there exists at least one
퐾∗퐷 ∈
(
퐾 푙퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
such that ∂푔퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷
∣∣∣
퐾∗퐷
= 0. 푀푃퐷(퐾퐷) characterizes this ﬁrst-order-
condition. Since ∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷 > 0 (from (6)), 퐾
푙
퐷 < 퐾
1
퐷 is equivalent to 푙퐷(퐾
1
퐷) > 2휉
푙, which
gives 퐵 < 퐵푙퐷.
To prove that 퐾∗퐷 ∈
(
퐾1퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
, it is suﬃcient to show that ∂푔퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷 > 0 for 퐾퐷 ∈(
퐾 푙퐷,퐾
1
퐷
]
. For 퐾퐷 > 퐾
푙
퐷, as follows from (7), we have
∂푔퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
=
(
1 +
1
푏
)
퐾
1
푏
퐷
∫ ∫
Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
[
휉1 + 휉2 − 2휉
(
퐾
퐾1
)− 1
푏
]
푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2
Let 퐻퐷(퐾퐷)
.
=
∫ ∫
Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
[
휉1 + 휉2 − 2휉
(
퐾
퐾1
)− 1
푏
]
푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2. Note that, for 퐾퐷 >
퐾 푙퐷, 퐻퐷(퐾퐷) and
∂푔퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
have the same sign, so we can use 퐻퐷(퐾퐷) to characterize the
sign of
∂푔3퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
. Deﬁne 푀퐷(퐾퐷, 흃)
.
= 휉1 + 휉2 − 2휉
(
퐾
퐾1
)− 1
푏 as the integrand in 퐻퐷(퐾퐷)
(without the density function). For 흃 such that 휉1 + 휉2 = 푙퐷(퐾퐷), we obtain 푀(퐾퐷, 흃) =
퐾
− 1
푏
퐷
[
2(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
(푏+1) − 퐵(1+푎퐷)+푃퐾퐷
]
< 0 since 푏 < −1. As 푀퐷(퐾퐷, 흃) is strictly increasing
in 휉푖 for 푖 ∈ {1, 2}, 푀퐷(퐾퐷, 흃) < 0 for 흃 such that 휉1 + 휉2 < 푙퐷(퐾퐷). Therefore, we have
퐻퐷(퐾퐷) >
∫ ∫ [
휉1 + 휉2 − 2휉
(
퐾퐷
퐾1퐷
)− 1
푏
]
푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2 = 2휉
[
1−
(
퐾퐷
퐾1퐷
)− 1
푏
]
. For 퐾퐷 ≤
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퐾1퐷, we have 2휉
[
1−
(
퐾퐷
퐾1퐷
)− 1
푏
]
≥ 0; and hence 퐻퐷(퐾퐷) > 0 for 퐾퐷 ∈
(
퐾 푙퐷,퐾
1
퐷
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3: The stage-1 objective function 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is strictly concave in
퐾퐷 for 퐾퐷 ∈
[
0,퐾 푙퐷
]
(and strictly increasing at 퐾퐷 = 0) and strictly decreasing in 퐾퐷 for
퐾 ∈
[
퐾ˆ퐷,퐾
푢
퐷
)
. If 휋퐷 is unimodal in 퐾퐷, thus 푔퐷(퐾퐷) is unimodal in 퐾퐷, it follows that
1. If
∂푔2퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
∣퐾푙퐷 ≤ 0, then the unique 퐾
∗
퐷 is characterized by the strictly concave part
(similar to Proposition 1).
2. If
∂푔2퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
∣퐾푙퐷 > 0, then the unique 퐾
∗
퐷 is characterized by 푀푃퐷(퐾
∗
퐷) = 0 as deﬁned
in Proposition 2. Let 퐾퐷 denote the optimal solution in this case. From Proposition
2, we have 퐾퐷 ≥ 퐾1퐷.
As it follows from the proof of Proposition 2,
∂푔2퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
∣∣∣
퐾푙퐷
> 0 is equivalent to 퐵 < 퐵푙퐷.
The optimal expected equity value of the ﬁrm, 휋∗퐷, follows directly.
We now prove that 휋∗퐷 decreases in 푎퐷. We have two cases to consider:
Case 1: 2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
] [
1− 훾퐷1+푎퐷
]
− 푃1+푎퐷 ≤ 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾1퐷
The ﬁrm’s optimal expected equity value is given by 휋∗퐷 =
2(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷퐾1퐷(푎퐷)
−(푏+1) + 퐵(1 +
푎퐷) + 푃 where 퐾
1
퐷(푎퐷) =
(
휉(1+ 1
푏
)
(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
)−푏
. We obtain
∂휋∗퐷
∂푎퐷
= −2푐퐷퐾1퐷(푎퐷) + 퐵 < 0 as
follows from the deﬁnition of Case 1.
Case 2: 0 ≤ 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾1퐷
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
] [
1− 훾퐷1+푎퐷
]
− 푃1+푎퐷
The ﬁrm’s optimal expected equity value is given by
휋∗퐷 =
∫ ∫
Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
[
(휉˜1 + 휉˜2)퐾퐷
(1+ 1
푏
) − 2푐퐷퐾퐷(1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) +퐵(1 + 푎퐷) + 푃
]
푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2.
Note that
∂휋∗퐷(퐾퐷)
∂푎퐷
= ∂휋퐷(퐾퐷)∂푎퐷
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
+ ∂휋퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
∂퐾퐷
∂푎퐷
. Since ∂휋퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
= 0, we obtain
∂휋퐷(퐾퐷)
∂푎퐷
∣∣∣∣
퐾퐷
=
∫ ∫
Υ퐷(흃;퐾퐷)
[−2푐퐷퐾퐷 +퐵] 푓(휉1, 휉2)푑휉1푑휉2 < 0
as follows from 퐾1퐷 < 퐾퐷 and the deﬁnition of Case 2.
Lemma A.1 If 푏 ≥ −2 and 흃 has a bivariate normal distribution, then 휋퐷 is unimodal in
퐾퐷.
Proof of Proposition 4: We deﬁne 푆1(푎퐷)
.
= 2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷 (1− 훾퐷)−푏
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)(푏+1)
(1+푎퐷)
such that for a given 푎퐷, for 퐵 ≥ 푆1(푎퐷), the ﬁrm uses a secured loan (and invests in
퐾∗퐷(푎퐷) = 퐾
1
퐷(푎퐷)) without default possibility. 퐵 ≥ 푆1(푎퐷) is equivalent to 푑퐷(퐾1퐷) ≤ 2휉푙.
Hence, both the default cost and the expected loss due to the unsecured part of the loan
35
are 0 in (4). We deﬁne 푆2(푎퐷)
.
= 푆1(푎퐷) − 푃(1+푎퐷) such that for 푆1(푎퐷) > 퐵 ≥ 푆2(푎퐷),
the ﬁrm uses a secured loan (and invests in 퐾∗퐷(푎퐷) = 퐾
1
퐷(푎퐷)) with default possibility.
퐵 ≥ 푆2(푎퐷) is equivalent to 푙퐷(퐾1퐷) ≤ 2휉푙. Hence, the default cost is strictly positive but
the expected loss due to the unsecured part of the loan is 0 in (4). For 퐵 < 푆2(푎퐷), the ﬁrm
optimally borrows to invest in 퐾∗퐷(푎) = 퐾퐷(푎퐷). In this case, the ﬁrm uses an unsecured
loan and both the default cost and the expected loss due to the unsecured part of the loan
are strictly positive in (4).
In summary, for any given 푎퐷, the ordering of 퐵 and thresholds 푆
1(푎퐷) and 푆
2(푎퐷)
determine the optimal borrowing level of the ﬁrm, and hence the form of Λ퐷(푎퐷). We
obtain ∂푆
1(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
< 0 for 푎퐷 ∈ [0, 푎푚푎푥퐷 ) thus, we can analyze the problem in two cases.
Case 1: 퐵 ≥ 푆1(0) = 2푐퐷퐾0퐷(1− 훾퐷)
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
.
As 푆1(푎퐷) is strictly decreasing, we have 퐵 ≥ 푆1(푎퐷) (and hence 퐵 > 푆2(푎퐷)) ∀푎퐷 ∈
[0, 푎푚푎푥퐷 ). Therefore, we have Λ퐷(푎퐷) = (2푐퐷퐾
1
퐷(푎퐷)−퐵)푎퐷 for 0 ≤ 푎퐷 < 푎푚푎푥퐷 .
Case 2: 퐵 < 푆1(0) = 2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷(1− 훾퐷)
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
.
In this case, the ordering of 퐵 and 푆2(푎퐷) is important in characterizing Λ퐷(푎퐷). We have
푆2(0) = 2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷(1− 훾퐷)
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
− 푃 and we obtain
∂푆2(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
=
1
(1 + 푎퐷)2
[
푃 − 2푐퐷퐾0 (1− 훾퐷)−푏
(
1− 휉
푙
휉
(
1 + 1푏
)) (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷)푏 [−푏(1 + 푎퐷)− 훾퐷]]
Notice that 푆2(0) is positive (negative) if 푃 is less (greater) than 2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷(1−훾퐷)
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
.
Since (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷)푏 [−푏(1 + 푎퐷)− 훾퐷] is strictly decreasing in 푎퐷, for 푃 ≥ 2푐퐷퐾0퐷(−푏 −
훾퐷)
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
, we have ∂푆
2(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
≥ 0 for 푎퐷 ≥ 0. For 푃 < 2푐퐷퐾0퐷(−푏−훾퐷)
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
,
there exists a unique 푎퐷 such that
∂푆2(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
≤ 0 for 푎퐷 ≤ 푎퐷 and ∂푆
2(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
> 0 for 푎퐷 > 푎퐷.
Since the signs of 푆2(0) and ∂푆
2(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
depend on 푃 , we have three subcases. Before analyzing
them, we ﬁrst present a Lemma that we will use throughout the rest of the proof.
Lemma A.2 We have 퐵 ≥ 푆1 (푎푚푎푥퐷 ) > 푆2 (푎푚푎푥퐷 ), ∀퐵 ≥ 0.
Subcase 2.1: 푃 ≥ 2푐퐷퐾0퐷
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
(−푏− 훾퐷).
In this case, we have 푆2(0) < 0 and ∂푆
2(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
≥ 0, ∀푎퐷. For 푎푚푎푥퐷 =
[(
2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷
퐵
)− 1
푏 − 1
]
(1− 훾퐷),
we obtain 푆2(푎푚푎푥퐷 ) < 0. Hence, for 푎퐷 ∈ [0, 푎푚푎푥퐷 ), we have 푆2(푎퐷) < 0 < 퐵. It follows that
the ﬁrm always uses a secured loan (and invests in 퐾1퐷(푎퐷)). For 퐵 < 푆
1(0) (which follows
from the deﬁnition of Case 2), since 푆1(푎퐷) is strictly decreasing in 푎퐷 and 퐵 ≥ 푆1(푎푚푎푥퐷 )
(from Lemma A.2), it follows that there exists a unique 푎푑퐷, as deﬁned by 푆
1(푎푑퐷)
.
= 퐵
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(where the superscript 푑 refers to “default”). We have 퐵 < 푆1(푎퐷) for 푎퐷 < 푎
푑
퐷, and the
ﬁrm uses a secured loan with default possibility, and 퐵 ≥ 푆1(푎퐷) for 푎퐷 ≥ 푎푑퐷, the ﬁrm
uses a secured loan without default possibility. Therefore, Λ퐷(푎퐷) is characterized by
Λ퐷(푎퐷) =
⎧⎨⎩ (2푐퐷퐾1퐷(푎퐷)−퐵)푎퐷 − 퐹 (푑퐷(퐾1퐷(푎퐷)))푆 if 0 ≤ 푎퐷 < 푎푑퐷(2푐퐷퐾1퐷(푎퐷)−퐵)푎퐷 if 푎푑퐷 ≤ 푎퐷 < 푎푚푎푥퐷 . ,
Subcase 2.2: 2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
(1− 훾퐷) ≤ 푃 < 2푐퐷퐾0퐷
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
(−푏− 훾퐷).
We have 푆2(0) ≤ 0, and 푆2(푎퐷) is ﬁrst strictly decreasing, and then strictly increasing in
a. We obtain 푆2(푎푚푎푥퐷 ) < 0; hence 푆
2(푎퐷) < 0 for 푎퐷 ∈ [0, 푎푚푎푥퐷 ) in this case. Therefore
Λ퐷(푎퐷) is identical to subcase 2.1.
Subcase 2.3: 2푐퐷퐾
0
퐷
[
1− 휉푙
휉(1+ 1푏 )
]
(1− 훾퐷) > 푃
We have 푆2(0) > 0, and 푆2(푎퐷) is ﬁrst strictly decreasing, and then strictly increasing in
푎퐷.
If 퐵 ≥ 푆2(0) (and 퐵 < 푆1(0) by deﬁnition of Case 2), since 퐵 ≥ 푆1 (푎푚푎푥퐷 ) > 푆2 (푎푚푎푥퐷 )
(from Lemma A.2), Λ퐷(푎퐷) is characterized in a similar fashion to the other two subcases.
If 퐵 < 푆2(0), as 푆2(푎퐷) is ﬁrst strictly decreasing, and then strictly increasing in 푎퐷 and
퐵 ≥ 푆1 (푎푚푎푥퐷 ) > 푆2 (푎푚푎푥퐷 ) (from Lemma A.2), there exists a unique 푎푙퐷 ∈ [0, 푎푚푎푥퐷 ), as
deﬁned in 푆2(푎푙퐷)
.
= 퐵 (where the superscript 푙 refers to “limited liability”). We have
퐵 < 푆2(푎퐷) for 푎퐷 < 푎
푙
퐷 and 퐵 ≥ 푆2(푎퐷) for 푎퐷 ≥ 푎푙퐷. Since 푆2(푎퐷) = 푆1(푎퐷)− 푃1+푎퐷 , it
follows that 푎푙퐷 ≤ 푎푑퐷, with equality only holding for 푃 = 0. Therefore, we have the following
three regions: For 푎퐷 < 푎
푙
퐷(< 푎
푑
퐷), we have 퐵 < 푆
2(푎퐷)(and 퐵 < 푆
1(푎퐷)), the ﬁrm uses
an unsecured loan; for 푎푙퐷 ≤ 푎퐷 < 푎푑퐷, we have 푆2(푎퐷) ≤ 퐵 < 푆1(푎퐷), and the ﬁrm uses
a secured loan with default possibility; and for 푎퐷 ≥ 푎푑퐷, we have 푆2(푎퐷) < 푆1(푎퐷) ≤ 퐵,
and the ﬁrm uses a secured loan without default possibility.
Proof of Proposition 5: Since this equilibrium is relevant for ﬁrms that may default
but use a secured loan (Case 푖푖 of Proposition 4) and ﬁrms that may use an unsecured loan
(Case 푖푖푖 of Proposition 4); we will analyze these two cases separately. At equilibria where
the ﬁrm uses a secured loan with default possibility, the creditor’s expected return with the
dedicated technology is given by
Λ퐷(푎퐷) =
(
2푐퐷퐾˙
1
퐷 −퐵
)
푎˙퐷 − 푆 × 푃푟
(
휉1 + 휉2 < 푑퐷(퐾˙
1
퐷)
)
,
where 푑퐷(퐾˙
1
퐷) = 2휉
(
1 + 1푏
) [
1− 퐵(1+푎˙퐷)
2푐퐷퐾˙
1
퐷(1+푎˙퐷−훾퐷)
]
. Since 흃 has a bivariate normal dis-
tribution, 휉1 + 휉2 is normally distributed with mean 휇 = 2휉 and standard deviation
휎 = 휎
√
2(1 + 휌). Since 푏 < −1 and 퐵 < 2푐퐷퐾˙1퐷[1 − 훾퐷], we obtain 푑퐷(퐾˙1퐷) < 휇. We
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have 푃푟
(
휉1 + 휉2 < 푑퐷(퐾˙
1
퐷)
)
= Φ
(
푑퐷(퐾˙
1
퐷)−휇
휎
)
where Φ(.) is the cdf of the standard nor-
mal random variable.
For ﬁrms that may default but use a secured loan (Case 푖푖 of Proposition 4), for any
푎퐷 ∈
[
0, 푎푑퐷
)
, we obtain
∂Λ퐷(푎퐷)
휌
= −퐵퐶 휙
(
푑퐷(퐾
1
퐷)− 휇
휎
)(
휇− 푑퐷(퐾1퐷)
휎2
)
∂휎
∂휌
< 0,
∂Λ퐷(푎퐷)
휎
= −퐵퐶 휙
(
푑퐷(퐾
1
퐷)− 휇
휎
)(
휇− 푑퐷(퐾1퐷)
휎2
)
∂휎
∂휎
< 0
where 휙(.) is the density function of the standard normal random variable, as follows from
∂
∂휌휎 =
휎
휎 > 0,
∂
∂휎휎 =
√
2(1 + 휌) > 0, and 푑퐷(퐾
1
퐷) < 휇. From the Pareto-optimality of the
equilibrium, i.e. 푎˙퐷 is the minimum 푎퐷 that satisﬁes Λ퐷(푎퐷) = 0, it follows that with an
increase in 휎 or 휌, 푎˙퐷 increases.
For ﬁrms that may use an unsecured loan, since 푎˙퐷 ∈ [푎푙퐷, 푎푑퐷), it follows from above
that ∂∂휏Λ퐷(푎퐷)
∣∣
푎˙퐷
< 0 for 휏 ∈ {휎, 휌}. In fact, Λ퐷(푎퐷) is decreasing in 휎 or 휌 for any
푎˙퐷 ∈ [푎푙퐷, 푎푑퐷), but we cannot characterize the eﬀect of 휎 or 휌 on Λ퐷(푎퐷) for 푎퐷 ∈
[
0, 푎푙퐷
)
.
Let 푎˙퐷(휏) denote the equilibrium ﬁnancing cost for a given 휏 ∈ {휎, 휌}. With a small
increment in 휏 from 휏0 to 휏1, we can guarantee that Λ퐷(푎퐷; 휏1) < 0 for ∀ 푎퐷 < 푎˙퐷(휏0)
because i) Λ퐷(푎퐷; 휏0) < 0 for ∀ 푎퐷 < 푎˙퐷(휏0) from the deﬁnition of the equilibrium, and ii)∣∣ ∂
∂휏Λ퐷(푎퐷)
∣∣ and ∣∣∣ ∂∂푎퐷Λ퐷(푎퐷)∣∣∣ are bounded. Therefore 푎˙퐷 increases (locally) in 휏 ∈ {휎, 휌}.
Since for a given 푎퐷, 휋
∗
퐷 is independent of 휏 ∈ {휎, 휌}, we have ∂ ˙휋퐷∂휏 =
∂휋∗퐷
∂푎퐷
∣∣∣
푎˙퐷
∂ ˙푎퐷
∂휏 . From
Proposition 3, we have
∂휋∗퐷
∂푎퐷
< 0, hence ∂ ˙휋퐷∂휏 < 0. Similarly, 퐾˙퐷 = 퐾
1
퐷(푎˙퐷) is independent
of 휏 ∈ {휎, 휌}; hence we have ∂퐾˙퐷∂휏 =
∂퐾1퐷(푎퐷)
∂푎퐷
∣∣∣
푎˙퐷
∂ ˙푎퐷
∂휏 . Since 퐾
1
퐷(푎퐷) decreases in 푎퐷, we
have ∂퐾˙퐷∂휏 < 0 for 휏 ∈ {휎, 휌}.
Lemma A.3 If 푏 ≥ −2 and 흃 has a bivariate normal distribution, then for a given ﬁnancing
cost 푎퐷 with the dedicated technology, for the ﬁrm that uses an unsecured loan, 퐾
∗
퐷 and 휋
∗
퐷
increase in 휎 and 휌, and decrease in 푎퐷.
Lemma A.4 If 푏 ≥ −2 and 흃 has a bivariate normal distribution, when the ﬁrm uses an
unsecured loan with the dedicated technology, the creditor’s net gain from secured lending
and its expected loss due to the unsecured part of the loan increase in 휎 and 휌. Its expected
default cost increases in 휎 and 휌 if 푑퐷(퐾퐷(푎퐷)) ≤ 2휉.
Proof of Remark 2 The form of 푐푃퐷(푐퐹 ) follows from a direct comparison of 휋˙퐷 and 휋˙퐹 in
perfect capital markets. Since 훾퐹 ≥ 훾퐷 by assumption, to prove 푐푃퐷(푐퐹 ) ≤ 푐퐹 it is suﬃcient
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to show 피−푏
[(
휉−푏1 + 휉
−푏
2
)− 1
푏
]
≥ 2휉−푏. From Hardy et. al (1988, p.146), if 푑 ∈ (0, 1)
and 푋,푌 are non-negative random variables then the following is true: 피1/푑
[
(푋 + 푌 )푑
]
≥
피1/푑
[
푋푑
]
+피1/푑
[
푌 푑
]
where equality only holds when 푋 and 푌 are eﬀectively proportional,
i.e. 푋 = 휆푌 . In 푐푃퐷(푐퐹 ), we have 푑 = −1푏 ∈ (0, 1) and 흃 ≥ 흃풍 ≥ 0, replacing 푋 with 휉−푏1 and
푌 with 휉−푏2 gives the desired result. Notice that 푐
푃
퐷(푐퐹 ) = 푐퐹 only if 휉1 = 휉2 (since we focus
on the symmetric bivariate distribution) and 훾퐹 = 훾퐷. 휉1 = 휉2 is only possible if either 흃
is deterministic or 휌 = 1.
B Proofs for Supporting Lemmas
Proof of Lemma A.1: Since 흃 has a bivariate normal distribution, 휓
.
= 휉1 + 휉2
is normally distributed with mean 휇 = 2휉 and standard deviation 휎 = 휎
√
2(1 + 휌).
Let 퐹 (.) denote the cdf of 휓, and 퐹 (.) = 1 − 퐹 (.). By using 휓, as follows from the
proof of Proposition 2; for 퐾퐷 ≥ 퐾 푙퐷, we have 푠푔푛
(
∂푔3퐷(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
)
= 푠푔푛(퐻퐷(퐾퐷)) where
퐻퐷(퐾퐷) =
∫ 휉푢
푙퐷(퐾퐷)
[
휓 − 2휉
(
퐾퐷
퐾1퐷
)− 1
푏
]
푓(휓)푑휓. Therefore we will focus on 퐻퐷(퐾퐷) to
prove the unimodality of 푔퐷(퐾퐷). From integration by parts, we obtain
퐻퐷(퐾퐷) =
∫ 2휉푢
푙퐷(퐾퐷)
퐹 (휓)푑휓 − 퐹 (푙퐷(퐾퐷))
[
퐾
− 1
푏
퐷
(
2 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) 푐퐷
− (푏+ 1) +
퐵(1 + 푎퐷) + 푃
퐾퐷
)]
.
Deﬁne Δ(퐾퐷)
.
= 퐾
− 1
푏
퐷
(
2(1+푎퐷−훾퐷)푐퐷
−(푏+1) +
퐵(1+푎퐷)+푃
퐾퐷
)
. We obtain
∂Δ(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
=
(
1 +
1
푏
)
퐾−1퐷
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷) +
−푏(푏+ 2)
(푏+ 1)2
2 (1 + 푎퐷 − 훾퐷) 푐퐷퐾−
1
푏
퐷
)
.
Note that for퐾퐷 > 퐾
푙
퐷, 푙퐷(퐾퐷) > 2휉
푙 ≥ 0; hence for 푏 ≥ −2 the second term is positive and
∂Δ(퐾퐷)
∂퐾퐷
> 0 for 퐾퐷 > 퐾
푙
퐷. We obtain 퐻퐷(퐾퐷) = 퐹 (푙퐷(퐾퐷))
[∫ 2휉푢
푙퐷(퐾퐷)
퐹 (휓)푑휓
퐹 (푙퐷(퐾퐷))
−Δ(퐾퐷)
]
.
As Δ(퐾퐷) is increasing in 퐾퐷, if we can show that
∫ 2휉푢
푙퐷(퐾퐷)
퐹 (휓)푑휓
퐹 (푙퐷(퐾퐷))
is decreasing in 퐾퐷, then
for 퐾퐷 > 퐾
푙
퐷, 퐻퐷(퐾퐷) can only change sign once, which is from positive to negative.
We now show that
∫ 2휉푢
푙퐷(퐾퐷)
퐹 (휓)푑휓
퐹 (푙퐷(퐾퐷))
is decreasing in 퐾퐷. Since 휓 is normally distributed
with mean 휇 and standard deviation 휎, by using the standard normal random variable, this
expression can be written as
−1[
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)]2 ∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷
[[
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)]2
− 휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)∫ ∞
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
(1− Φ(푧))푑푧
]
(8)
where Φ(.) and 휙(.) are the cdf and pdf of the standard normal random variable respectively.
Since ∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)∂퐾퐷 > 0, it is suﬃcient to show that the last term in parenthesis is positive. Let
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푣 = 푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇휎 . Using integration by parts, we obtain
∫∞
푣 (1−Φ(푧))푑푧 = 휙(푣)− 푣(1−Φ(푣)).
Substituting this in (8), it is suﬃcient to show that 1 >
[
휙(푣)
1−Φ(푣)
]2 − 푣휙(푣)1−Φ(푣) which directly
follows from Sampford (1953).
Proof of Lemma A.3: For a given 푎퐷, the optimal expected equity value 휋
∗
퐷 is given by[
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)][
휇퐾
(1+ 1
푏
)
퐷 +퐵(1 + 푎퐷) + 푃 − 2(1 + 푎퐷)푐퐷퐾퐷
]
+ 휎퐾
(1+ 1
푏
)
퐷 휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)
.
where 휇 = 2휉 and 휎 = 휎
√
2(1 + 휌). Since 휎 is increasing in 휎 or 휌, it is suﬃcient to analyze
the impact of 휎. We have
∂휋∗퐷
∂휎 =
∂휋퐷
∂퐾퐷
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
∂퐾퐷
∂휎 +
∂휋퐷
∂휎
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
where the ﬁrst term is zero from
the optimality of 퐾. We obtain ∂휋퐷∂휎
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
= 퐾
(1+ 1
푏
)
퐷 휙
(
푙(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
> 0.
For퐾∗퐷 = 퐾퐷, since퐾퐷 is the unique maximizer, we have 푠푔푛
(
∂퐾퐷
∂휎
)
= 푠푔푛
(
∂푀푃퐷(퐾퐷)
∂휎
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
)
.
Using the optimality condition[
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)][
(1 +
1
푏
)휇퐾
1
푏
퐷 − 2(1 + 푎퐷)푐퐷
]
= −(1 + 1
푏
)휎퐾
1
푏
퐷휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)
, (9)
we obtain ∂푀푃퐷(퐾퐷)∂휎
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
= (1+1푏 )퐾
1
푏
퐷휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)⎡⎣( 푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)2
+ 1−
휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
1−Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
⎤⎦.
Let 푧 =
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
. We need to show that 1 > 푧
[
휙(푧)
1−Φ(푧) − 푧
]
. It follows from Sampford
(1953) that
[
휙(푧)
1−Φ(푧) − 푧
]
< 1−Φ(푧)휙(푧) ; therefore it is suﬃcient to show 1 >
푧(1−Φ(푧))
휙(푧) which also
follows from Sampford (1953).
For the impact of 푎˙퐷 on 퐾퐷, we have 푠푔푛
(
∂퐾퐷
∂푎퐷
)
= 푠푔푛
(
∂푀푃퐷(퐾퐷)
∂푎퐷
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
)
. Using the
optimality condition in (9), we obtain ∂푀푃퐷(퐾퐷)∂푎퐷
∣∣∣
퐾퐷
=
[
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)]
×
⎡⎢⎣−2푐퐷 + (1 + 1
푏
)퐾
1
푏
퐷
∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)
∂푎퐷
⎡⎢⎣
⎛⎝ 휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
⎞⎠2 − 휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
1− Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
⎤⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎦ .
Denoting 푌 as the last expression in brackets and using ∂푙퐷(퐾퐷)∂푎퐷 = 퐾
−1
푏
퐷
[
2푐퐷 − 퐵퐾퐷
]
, the
desired result follows because −2푐퐷 + (1 + 1푏 )
[
2푐퐷 − 퐵퐾퐷
]
푌 < 0 as 푌 < 1 from Sampford
(1953).
Proof of Lemma A.4: We only provide the proof for the expected loss due to the
unsecured part of the loan. The proofs for the default risk and the net gain from secured
lending can be obtained in a similar fashion, and are omitted. Since 휎 is increasing in 휎 or
휌, it is suﬃcient to analyze the impact of 휎. By using the standard normal random variable,
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the expected loss due to the unsecured part of the loan can be written as
Φ
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)[
퐾퐷(1 + 푎퐷)2푐퐷 − 휇퐾(1+
1
푏
)
퐷 −퐵(1 + 푎퐷)− 푃
]
+ 휎휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)− 휇
휎
)
퐾
(1+ 1
푏
)
퐷 .
Taking the derivative with respect to 휎, and using the optimality condition in (9), the
derivative with respect to 휎 is given by 휙
(
푙퐷(퐾퐷)−휇
휎
)
퐾
(1+ 1
푏
)
퐷 +
∂퐾퐷
∂휎
[
2(1 + 푎퐷)푐퐷 − 휇퐾
1
푏
퐷
]
.
This term is positive because ∂퐾퐷∂휎 > 0 from Lemma A.3 and the last expression is positive
from the optimality condition in (9).
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